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Terminal Sedation and
Dehydration'
The range of medical intervention at
life's end can vary greatly,from
sedation to euthanasia.

By Charles F. McKhann
ichael was thirty-seven when he
began to have abdominal pain.
It was a vague pain in the upper
part of the abdomen, and was
thought to be due to an ulcer.
However, two months later, the pain had increased
and it was clear that he was losing weight in spite of
eating fairly well. An operation was performed that
revealed that he had cancer of the pancreas. Moreover, the tumor was extensive and could not be
removed surgically. Michael declined chemotherapy
after hearing that it was very unlikely to prolong his
life significantly. Although he had increasing discomfort, it was controlled with medication and he
continued to be fairly active as a dentist.
Michael was part of a large Catholic family, having three brothers and a sister in addition to his wife
and four small children. His parents were still alive.
Understanding his grim prognosis, namely that he
might have only a few weeks to live, Michael discussed his outlook with all of the members of his
family except the children, whom he thought were
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too young to understand. These discussions were
mostly one on one, but occasionally in small groups.
He was a strong-willed, pragmatic man who was not
prone to sentiment. He explained, "This is the situation, and I am sorry about it. I am sorry that my
life is going to be cut short and that I have to die so
young, leaving Nancy and the children. If there is
something beyond the grave, I will enjoy it. Until
then, I would like to have as much togetherness and
as little sadness as possible with all of you."
Michael also came up with a new idea, that when
he was no longer able to eat or drink by himself, he
would stop doing so altogether. He did not want to
have anyone helping him to eat, nor did he want to
have any tubes or intravenous feeding. He realized
that this step would probably shorten his life by a
few days, but also felt that the quality of his life, as
well as that of his family, would be totally destroyed
if he waited for the disease to take its natural course.
He wanted to have some control over when and how
his life ended. His family could see that he was going downhill rapidly, and no one objected to his
proposal. His physician, a personal friend, promised
to provide him with good pain relief and came to his
home often. He wanted to spend as much time at
home as possible, but wanted to die in the hospital
so that the home itself would not be associated with
the memory of his death.
Five weeks after his surgery, he felt the time had
come to stop eating or drinking. Nobody tried to
talk him out of it, and his physician supported him
with appropriate medication so that he felt very little
discomfort. A brother from out of state came to spend
a day with him, preferring to be with him when he
was awake and coherent rather than at the time of
his death. The dying process took a week. Towards
the end, he was comatose and was transferred to the
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hospital, as he requested, where he spent his last two
days. The timing of his death was predictable, and
most of his family was present.
During the final week, and in the weeks and
months following his death, there were no recriminations. The entire family felt that Michael's choice
was the right choice under the circumstances, and
many said that they would do the same thing in a
similar situation. At no time did he seem depressed.
Indeed, he provided meaningful moral support to
other members of his family, particularly his wife
and children. His memory lives on with his family
as a strong-willed, "nuts and bolts" guy, who faced
his impending death directly and unflinchingly. His
own acceptance of "what must be" provided a foundation of reality and acceptance for his family that
they still remember.
I heard the history of Michael's death from his
brother, shortly after it occurred. It was my first exposure to the concept of voluntary terminal sedation
and dehydration, and I was deeply impressed with
how autonomous and brave the step seemed to be. I
have subsequently seen it in a broader perspective.
It was still an autonomous and brave decision, but it
may also be a sad but necessary compromise with
reality. I do not know if Michael had the remotest
thoughts of any form of assisted dying. At the present
time, other end-of-life options, including assisted
suicide and euthanasia, are against the law, but terminal sedation is not. The components of terminal
sedation that I will look at include dehydration, sedation, double effect, intent, and some legal
considerations. First, we must see where terminal
sedation fits in the spectrum of possibilities for the
person who wants to die on his own terms.
Clinical Differences
The range of medical intervention at the end of life
includes none at all (where none is available or
wanted), refusing or discontinuing treatment including hydration, various forms of sedation, assisted
suicide, and euthanasia. Morally, patient refusal of
treatment, terminal sedation, assisted suicide, and
euthanasia are very similar. The patient wants to die
sooner rather than later and at some level, even if it
is against the law, the physician may be willing to
help. If one is acceptable, they probably all should
be. However, legislatures, courts, and many physicians and medical ethicists see significant differences
between these activities. The advantage of terminal

sedation over assisted suicide and euthanasia at the
present time is that sedation is legal. This is an important dividing line.
The right to refuse treatment is a basic element
of patient autonomy. In making such a decision, the
patient shoulders most of the responsibility, and the
physician is required by law to honor the decision,
even if it appears to be contrary to the best interests
of the patient. It is now widely accepted that the body
of a competent person cannot be violated against
his will by any treatment, however beneficial it may
seem to be. Refusal can be for highly technical support systems, such as renal dialysis or artificial
ventilation, or for more basic elements of support,
such as artificial feeding, or any other treatment that
could extend life. It can also include refusing normal food and drink. At this point, it becomes
voluntary terminal dehydration. The addition of sedation to control symptoms advances this to terminal
sedation.
A person who refuses to eat or drink can only be
nourished artificially. Since administering unwanted
nourishment is against the law, the refusal must be
accepted. This point is important because it extends
the concept of terminal dehydration from the patient who is terminally unable to eat or drink, to one
who is pre-terminal and refuses to eat or drink. Indeed, theoretically, death by dehydration can be
elected by anyone who wishes to take such a step to
end his life, regardless of age or medical circumstances. Most people who are physically well but
suffering from depression have other ways of killing
themselves that are instantaneous and carry little risk
of outside intervention.
The use of drugs to ameliorate pain, anxiety, and
general distress in a dying patient, representing the
simplest application of terminal sedation, is recognized and used throughout the world where the
appropriate drugs and medical care are available.
This use of sedation is morally, medically, and legally acceptable, and has been for centuries. Sedation
at the end of life is the natural extension of providing narcotics to relieve the suffering of any patient
who has a chronic, painful illness. 2 There is no reason why sedation for the management of symptoms
cannot be extended to the patient whose terminal
dehydration is elective, just as it would be to one
whose dehydration was an obligatory part of the
natural course of his disease. As will be seen, terminal dehydration and sedation can be treated as
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separate entities, but they can also be blended together in various ratios that give their combination
a special place in this spectrum.
Beyond refusal of treatment, terminal sedation,
and dehydration are two much more controversial
areas of intervention: physician-assisted suicide and
euthanasia. In assisted suicide, the patient is given a
prescription for lethal drugs that he may take when
he feels that the distress of the illness is overwhelming. Many patients feel reassured that they are "in
control" by having the drugs on hand, even though
they may never take them. In physician-assisted suicide, the doctor's role is a more active one
psychologically, morally, and legally, even though it
is limited to filling out a prescription for a potentially lethal drug. Moral responsibility is shared with
the patient, who must still undertake the final act of
taking the drug. Many physicians would prefer this,
since it does not require being present at the time of
death. Indeed, the physician may not even know if
the patient died of his terminal disease or from taking the drug. Physicians may deceive themselves, or
be deceived by their patients, into thinking that the
prescription was actually requested for sleep. Laws
permitting assisted suicide have been looked at and
rejected by many states, but were passed and are
currently in effect in Oregon.
In voluntary euthanasia, the patient asks his physician to personally administer a lethal dose of drugs,
usually intravenously. Here the final step is clearly
in the hands of the physician. Death occurs within a
few minutes of administration of the drugs, and the
physician's direct responsibility is obvious. For this
reason alone, many physicians who support the concept of assisted dying prefer that it be assisted suicide
and not euthanasia. Legislators who support assisted
dying view euthanasia as being more radical and
vulnerable to abuse than assisted suicide. Conservative religious groups view euthanasia as the "end of
the line" and often cite assisted suicide as a dangerous step in that direction.

Dehydration
Many people die of dehydration as a natural outcome of their disease. This includes most people who
have cancer, particularly intra-abdominal cancers,
severe stroke, or other serious deterioration of mental function, or any progressive illness that leads
to increasing weakness to the point of being unable
to handle food or liquids. At that point, artificial
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feeding, intravenously or by a gastric tube, can be
instituted if the patient's underlying illness is not terminal. Such steps are usually omitted if the patient is
not expected to live long. People who die at home
rarely have access to artificial nutrition. It is generally understood that when a person is admitted to a
hospice facility, no artificial feeding of any kind will
be instituted, and when a person becomes unable to
eat or drink, no attempt will be made to circumvent
this terminal event. In non-fatal illnesses such as severe stroke, dementia, or brain death, the use of
supportive treatment in the form of artificial nutrition may be seriously questioned by the family and/
or physician, and eventually rejected or withdrawn.
However, in many parts of the world that do not
share the widespread use of our medical advantages,
patients with fatal chronic illnesses usually eventually die from dehydration. There are strong reasons
to question whether our own medical technology
should be utilized as frequently as it is.
Cessation of all fluid intake, particularly if no
food is taken, usually causes lethal dehydration in
one or two weeks. There is no obvious systemic reaction in the first few days. The most common
symptoms are thirst and dryness of the mouth. Mild
sedation can control the thirst easily and oral dryness responds well to sips of water, sucking on ice
chips, and lubrication of the lips. Neurological signs,
consisting of lethargy, weakness, confusion, and eventually progressive coma, appear later, beginning in
four or five days. Pain and discomfort are moderated by accumulation of ketones in the body as it
utilizes fat rather than carbohydrates to meet its energy needs, and by a form of autosedation, the causes
of which are not known, seen in the dying process.
Death is due to loss of circulating blood volume and
to electrolyte imbalance, particularly the accumulation of potassium and calcium, which cause cardiac
arrhythmias.
Many studies report that dehydration in terminal disease is associated with no significant suffering. 3
"For individuals carrying an intolerable burden of
illness and disability, or those who have no hope of
ever again enjoying meaningful human interaction,
the withdrawal of food and fluid may be considered
without concern that it would add to the misery."4
Two hospice nurses wrote, "We have not seen evidence that dehydration occurring at the termination
of life results in any pain or distressing experiences
for the patient. "I The symptoms of thirst or dryness
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of the mouth can be easily relieved.6 When terminal
dehydration is elected by a patient who is not really
terminal, control of thirst is well within the range of
commonly used sedation.
In spite of this information, terminal dehydration is associated in the minds of most people with
serious and unnecessary suffering. Families and physicians alike may be reluctant to suggest dehydration
because of the universal symbolism associated with
feeding and nurturing as expressions of care and
love.7 Voluntary dehydration is a way to end life that
often requires enough willpower and resolve on the
part of the patient to not only see the process through
himself, but also enlist the support of reluctant family members and even physicians.
Dehydration is also thought to be closely linked
to starvation, and both have very negative connotations. Starvation is a time-honored form of
punishment and, when self-imposed, is often used
to gain public sympathy for political purposes. In
both of these situations, dehydration is not included
for the simple reason that death would occur much
too soon. Death from dehydration in terminal disease is usually preceded by significant starvation
because adequate amounts of fluids are more easily
ingested than sufficient food. However, in voluntary
dehydration this may not be the case. It must then
be understood that the critical step is dehydration.
Starvation alone, with little or no restriction of fluid
intake, can require many weeks or even months to
be lethal, depending on the nutritional status of the
individual at the beginning.'

Sedation and Palliative Care
Relief of suffering is the oldest and still the most basic
element of medical care. When treatment is directed
at symptoms alone and not at the cause of the illness, it is considered palliative care, and is intended
to provide as much comfort as possible. This includes
spiritual and personal support for patients and their
families, better home care with adequate help, and
attention to all causes of distress and suffering. The
latter has focused on symptom control, looking at
the indications for medication, the most appropriate drugs to use, and the dosage required to relieve
different types of suffering. There is no question that
much of the new interest in palliative care was stimulated by the "threat" of legalized assisted dying, for
which there is strong support from the general public (about sixty-five percent) and moderate support

within the medical profession (as many as forty percent of physicians who care for dying patients).
The cornerstone of good palliative care is appropriate medication to relieve all physical and
psychological suffering. Symptoms and distress increase towards the end of life in chronic illnesses,
and often reach a climax in the final weeks and days.
It is not surprising that steps to control these symptoms must also increase. In many illnesses, this
eventually requires the use of moderate to large doses
of narcotics. The increasing need for narcotics with
advancing symptoms has caused some misunderstanding among physicians. A few years ago they
were hesitant to give enough medication to control
suffering out of fear of causing tolerance and addiction, even though short-term addiction in a person
dying of cancer is hardly a threat to the patient or to
society. More recently, concern about causing addiction has faded, only to be replaced by the fear of
killing the patient by inadvertently giving too much
medication. Again, many physicians are reluctant to
give enough medication to provide even reasonable
relief of symptoms. In fact, the amount of sedation
required to control symptoms is extremely variable
from one person to another. Some cancer patients
require such enormous doses of narcotics just to control their underlying pain that upper limits on how
much morphine should be legally permissible are
meaningless.
Terminal Sedation and Dehydration
Within the spectrum of interventions, between refusal of treatment and euthanasia, elective
dehydration and sedation assume greater importance
when they are combined. The resulting terminal sedation usually takes place at home or in a hospice
institution. Most acute care hospitals are too singleminded in their mission, too aggressive in their
treatment, and too conservative in their thinking to
accept such a responsibility. The patient can elect
dehydration at any point in his illness up to the terminal phases, where it may be a function of his
disease and no longer elective at all. Sedation, usually in the form of narcotics, can be provided in
amounts just sufficient to control both the symptoms
of his underlying illness and any added discomfort
caused by the dehydration, primarily thirst. Indeed,
the medications required to control the symptoms
of the underlying disease may cover thirst too,
with nothing more needed. The level of sedation is
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obviously an important factor. The patient who has
very little underlying discomfort may need only mild
sedation to control thirst. For several days he may
be conscious and able to communicate with his family, helping them to adjust. He will have time to
reconsider and even reverse his decision if he wants
to. Conversely, patients with serious underlying pain
and/or severe anxiety and fear of death may want
enough sedation to render them somnolent most or
all of the time. They may accept impending death
and want nothing more than to shorten the duration of their suffering.
It must be recognized that high levels of sedation eliminate the desire or even the ability to eat or
drink. This becomes an important issue when the
patient requests total sedation to the point of somnolence in order to be unable to eat or drink. In other
words, the process begins with heavy sedation, after
which fluids are withdrawn. This precludes any suffering from underlying discomfort or thirst. Death,
however, results from dehydration, requiring several
days or more for completion, during which time the
drugs are given in sufficient quantity to maintain the
patient in a state of "chemical oblivion." At this level
of sedation, he certainly is not able to recant his decision or reverse the process. Thus, terminal sedation
can utilize enough, and only enough, sedation to relieve physical symptoms, a practice that is unlikely
to be challenged. Higher levels of sedation, however,
can render the patient semiconscious and unaware
of dehydration and the dying process. As we will
see, this is a step with more significant moral and
legal implications.
Between the extremes of minimal and total sedation there is clearly room for negotiation between
patient and physician. The timing of the beginning
of sedation is a factor. Sedation could begin on the
same day, at the same time, that food and drink are
first refused. A more punitive approach would be to
require that the patient undergo one, two, or even
three days of dehydration before receiving symptomatic relief. As we have seen, the agreed-upon level of
sedation is clearly a very important variable. In practice, the entire agreement concerning terminal
dehydration and sedation is essentially made between
patient, family, and physician, and is extremely difficult to regulate or monitor from outside. The
various combinations of terminal sedation and dehydration blend into each other so completely as to
defy precise definitions. They are densely tangled with

the concepts of active and passive euthanasia, double
effect, and intent.

Active and Passive Euthanasia
A persistent area of confusion is the concept of active versus passive euthanasia. 9 Euthanasia performed
by a physician is the standard of active participation
in a patient's death. Many people also see the
physician's role in assisted suicide as being an active
one, even though the activity may be limited to writing a prescription without ever knowing whether or
not the prescription was filled or the drugs taken.
The term passive euthanasia is applied to all situations where the patient refuses to start or elects to
discontinue any form of treatment. If the treatment
is chemotherapy of marginal value in the face of a
progressing cancer, the issue may not be of great
moral significance to either the patient or the physician. However, when the request is to discontinue a
respirator for a patient who is competent and conscious, physicians usually see this step as being quite
active on their part, far more so than simply writing
a prescription for sleeping medication. Indeed, the
level of activity is reflected in how the law would
react if the respirator were turned off under identical circumstances by a family member, or anyone
other than a physician.
The basis for passive euthanasia is the concept that
the patient will die of his underlying disease when the
treatment is stopped. For the cancer patient stopping
chemotherapy, more rapid progression of the disease
may indeed take place. However, discontinuing artificial respiration is usually expected to cause death
promptly. Truly, the patient may have been on respiratory assistance because of pulmonary failure, but his
condition was well maintained and stable until the ventilator was stopped. The patient need not have died
and, indeed, would not have died had the respirator
been left in operation. It is stretching reality significantly to attribute the patient's death directly and only
to his underlying disease. This is an important point
because when a patient whose death is not imminent
elects terminal dehydration, his death will be due to
dehydration and not to his underlying disease. Theoretically, in dehydration the physician's role can be
completely passive; the act can be carried out by the
patient without any physician involvement at all.
There are even various levels of activity within
"passive euthanasia." Not feeding a person in the
face of starvation or not giving antibiotics in the face
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of infection, or not starting a respirator in the face
of respiratory failure are deliberate decisions not to
act, and to many people seem very passive indeed.
On the other hand, discontinuing treatment already
in progress, particularly removal of a respirator, is
viewed by most as being much more active.
The ambiguity of active versus passive is
straddled by terminal dehydration, with or without
sedation. Death by dehydration of a person who is
too ill to eat or drink is certainly passive. The decision not to provide artificial hydration and nutrition
is only slightly less so. On the other hand, refusal of
hydration by one who is able to eat and drink is an
active decision to end life. While the process of dehydration to the point of death may seem passive,
death is elected and would not occur if food and
drink were continued.
Double Effect
Much of medical treatment is the balancing of potential benefits against risks. A simple example of
this is the risk that a patient may be encouraged to
take in open-heart surgery or bone marrow transplantation. The physician intends to make the patient
better, but recognizes that failure could be fatal. The
use of narcotics to control pain and suffering carries
the risk of depressing respiration and ending the
patient's life. The limits of this compromise are
reached when it is foreseen that life will probably be
shortened, so long as the primary intent is to relieve
suffering. This time-honored acceptance of risk acknowledges the fact that narcotics needed to relieve
suffering do have a side effect that may be fatal.
The Doctrine of Double Effect was introduced
into our thinking by St. Thomas Aquinas to rationalize killing in self-defense and in war, two
circumstances where Christ's teaching to turn the
other cheek was not politically acceptable. 10 The intended good effect of such killing is that I will live,
while the unfortunate but foreseen bad effect is that
my attacker must die. Translated into the typical
medical situation, there are four requirements to the
double effect:
1. The drug must be given primarily for its good
effect, to relieve suffering
2. Death should not be intended, but may be foreseen and accepted as a consequence of giving
the drug
3. The benefit to the patient (relief of suffering)
should outweigh the risk of harm (earlier death)
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4. The bad effect, death, must not be required in
order to relieve suffering
Much of the relief of suffering that physicians have
been able to provide for their patients over the centuries has been due to the acceptance of the double
effect doctrine by physicians, the church, the public,
and the law. Within this acceptance, compassionate
physicians have often pushed the unfortunate but
foreseen secondary effect of narcotics when it was
clear that mercy required a prompt and painless
death.
The principle of double effect began as a compromise between Christian morality and political reality.
When applied to human suffering, it provides a moral,
religious, and legal loophole by which physicians can
meet the most urgent needs of their patients, as they
have done for centuries. Extension of the double effect
into the broad area of terminal sedation is also commonplace, particularly in the last days of life. Through
a prior understanding with the patient, in response to
requests from the family, or simply out of compassion,
physicians often maintain high doses or even increase
the administration of narcotics to shorten the agonal
phase of dying. Eating and drinking usually have
stopped, and the patient may neither know nor care
what is happening.
However, there is also the patient who does know
and care what is happening, and who does not want
to witness his own dying. Preliminary sedation can
render him oblivious to his predicament and suffering, at the expense of being able to eat or drink. When
interpreted strictly, the principle of double effect does
not apply to this form of terminal sedation very
well.11 The primary intent in giving the drug is to
relieve the symptoms of the underlying disease and
of thirst in a patient who will not eat or drink. However, if sufficient sedation is given, the secondary
effect is that the patient cannot eat or drink. The
amount of sedation needed to relieve most suffering
and thirst may be less than the amount required to
produce somnolence, and usually much less than the
amount required to significantly shorten life by the
use of the drugs alone. Dehydration, then, is the primary intent of the patient, and even the initial step
begun by him, and sedation is given only to relieve
symptoms. However, dehydration soon becomes the
secondary, unintended effect of the sedating drugs.
Rather than being just possible and perhaps undesired, with adequate sedation and fluid restriction,
death is inevitable. Thus, terminal sedation and the
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double effect are related in the minds of many people.
Although they are not identical, both are venerable
practices that are accepted as components of palliative care and both are considered to be within legal
and medical standards.12

Intent
The patient who wishes to shorten his life in order
to avoid unnecessary suffering may feel that he has
little to lose. Dying seems the lesser of two evils, when
compared to continuing life as it is. Furthermore,
the patient may see little difference between stopping treatment (including taking fluids) and assisted
suicide or euthanasia. His goal is the same, and one
that he would like to attain as painlessly and rapidly
as possible. Assisted suicide would take a few hours
and may be vastly preferable to dehydration, requiring as long as two weeks. Euthanasia, which requires
only a few minutes, might be preferable to assisted
suicide. Indeed, in Holland, where assisted suicide
and euthanasia are both legally accepted, far more
patients request euthanasia, usually at the hands of
their family doctors, than request assisted suicide.
This is clearly the easiest and least stressful approach
from the patient's point of view.
The desires of the autonomous patient still receive little consideration when pitted against the
barriers of our legislatures and our conservative religious and medical organizations. The rapid growth
of interest in biomedical ethics in the past few years
has focused mostly on physicians and other health
care professionals, with somewhat less attention to
the desires and needs of patients and their families. 3
Pressure for personal autonomy has gained some
respect from a reluctant and paternalistic medical
profession, but this definitely does not yet extend to
a complete range of choices in end-of-life issues.
It is commonly stated in psychiatry that anyone
who wishes to die is mentally ill, by definition. Certainly, most suicides are due to depression and should
be prevented, if at all possible. However, these generalizations are too broad and do not apply to people
who are already dying and who wish to shorten the
duration of their suffering. My own interviews with
terminally ill patients, some only a few days from
death, with physicians, and with two psychiatrists
who deal frequently with dying patients, support this.
Some perfectly sane and rational people would like
to die sooner rather than later, and for very understandable reasons. Indeed, most physicians who take
care of significant numbers of people with slowly

fatal illnesses know that their patients are perfectly
sane and would be amused or insulted to be considered otherwise.
Some conservative religions teach that suffering
at the end of life is an important and desirable aspect of dying, an opportunity for growth for the
patient who must endure it and for the family who
must witness it. Any thought or attempt to shorten
one's suffering and life are the equivalent of suicide
and therefore forbidden. The concept of "rational
suicide," or wishing to die even at the extreme end
of life, has no place in such religious teachings. It is
accepted that nothing need be done to prolong life,
but stressed that nothing should be done to shorten
it. This extreme view is certainly not shared by the
general public and is often rejected even by members of the same conservative religious groups when
they are faced with their own personal decisions. At
this point, the preferences of the individual may be
subordinated to the dictates of the religion, enforced
by family and the religious institution. Most physicians feel that it would be unconscionable to say that
the person who elects to shorten his life by dehydration must forego all pain medication, regardless of
his underlying needs. The precedent for sedation is
well established. When a conscious and competent
patient requests that artificial respiration be discontinued, the physician is expected to provide
appropriate sedation in advance so that the terror of
suffocating is eliminated.
Deeply embedded in this controversy is the
physician's intent. Here it must be understood that
intent really means willingness to personally accept
responsibility for the death of the patient as the possible, probable, or even inevitable outcome of the
action taken. In the absence of serious underlying
illness, physicians rarely, if ever, want to kill patients
or to simply help them die. The physician's intent is
to try to meet the wishes of the patient in relieving
unbearable suffering. The extent to which the physician accepts direct responsibility for ending the
patient's life is a measure of this intent.
It is perfectly acceptable for a patient to intend
to die. But it is not all right, under most circumstances, for a physician to openly intend the death
of a patient. It is well known that some compassionate physicians help patients die under appropriate
circumstances, while fully intending to do so, but
only in the presence of severe suffering. This is done
in private, with the understanding of the patient and/
or family. While it may be publicly acknowledged in
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anonymous polls, and in very general terms, specific
instances are rarely mentioned.
The gray zone of physicians' intent is underscored
in any discussion of terminal sedation. Many factors contribute to this: Which comes first, the
initiation of sedation or the initiation of dehydration? If the process begins with the patient's refusal
to ingest fluids, when is sedation begun? How much
sedation is required or permissible? (Just enough to
allay symptoms, including thirst? Enough to produce
somnolence most of the time? Enough to provide
oblivion to the dying process throughout its entire
duration?) Should sedation be moderated towards
the end when it may no longer be needed? How
closely can or should the process be monitored by
the physician? Is the risk of overdosing and pharmacologically shortening life acceptable?
A physician's intent is often unrecognized because
it is easily denied or rationalized to meet the circumstances. The law recognizes this and tries to hold us
to our actions, rather than our intentions, intentions
being hard to prove or disprove. "The law typically
holds people responsible for the foreseeable consequences of their acts, even if they had no intent to
cause those consequences."4 Interestingly, however,
the law has chosen not to look very closely at physicians' intentions in matters related to double effect
and terminal sedation. Indeed, the physicians' rationale is relatively easy: they are giving narcotics to
control the suffering of dying patients. The use of
sedation to prevent suffering at the end of life is traditional and essential to good care.
Legal Aspects of Terminal Sedation
The legality of terminal sedation is based on two
important precedents, and has been strongly endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court. The right to refuse
medical treatment is deeply ingrained in the Constitution, and relief of suffering is a basic component
of medical care. Justice Brandeis wrote in 1928 that
"The makers of our constitution ... conferred, as
against the government, the right to be let alonethe most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized man.""5 Relatively recently, the
concept was extended to include artificial feeding 6
and normal ingestion of food and drink. 17 In support of this, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote, "We think
the distinction between assisting suicide and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment, a distinction
widely recognized and endorsed in the medical
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profession and in our legal traditions, is both important and logical; it is certainly rational. " 8 More
important, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit pointed out, regardless of the patients' expectation or intent, death resulting from refusal of
treatment is not legally considered to be suicide. "We
believe that there is a strong argument that a decision by a terminally ill patient to hasten by medical
means a death that is already in process, should not
be classified as suicide." 9 This is a critical point because, by extension, it means that providing sedation
for such a patient is providing relief from suffering,
but it is not assisting suicide.
In 1997, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously
rejected a constitutional right to physician-assisted
suicide, overturning the opinions of two Circuit
Courts of Appeal.20 However, this rejection of assisted suicide was accompanied by very strong
statements concerning palliative care and sedation
by Justices O'Connor, Ginsberg, Breyer, Souter, and
Stevens. Speaking most emphatically for this group,
Justice O'Connor said, "[A] patient who is suffering
from a terminal illness and experiencing great pain
has no legal barriers to obtaining medication, from
qualified physicians, to alleviate that suffering, even
to the point of causing unconsciousness and hastening death. ' 21 Justice Breyer supported this, saying,
"[T]he laws of New York and Washington do not
prohibit doctors from providing patients with drugs
sufficient to control pain despite the risk that those
drugs themselves will kill." 22 Professor Robert Burt
of Yale Law School notes that "The Supreme Court
majority has thus provided an unexpected but strong
and very welcome directive requiring states to remove the barriers that their laws and policies impose
on the availability of palliative care. ' 23 By stating
that terminal sedation for symptomatic relief is not
assisted suicide, the Court has endorsed an aggressive practice of palliation.
Professor David Orentlicher of Indiana University School of Law goes beyond this, pointing out
that the extension of palliative care to include terminal sedation could create a situation that is morally
and legally close to euthanasia, and well beyond assisted suicide.2 4 Total sedation of an individual prior
to stopping of food and fluids renders the patient
comatose and helpless, at the mercy of his physician
for the remaining days of life, a form of slow euthanasia. In this extreme form of terminal sedation,
physicians take almost as much responsibility for the
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patient's death as they would by giving a lethal injection. Orentlicher's purpose is not to condemn
terminal sedation, but to point out that the Court
seems to be endorsing a possible form of euthanasia, while rejecting physician-assisted suicide, when
the latter may be more desirable for the patient and
carry less risk of abuse.
In the spectrum of end-of-life interventions, terminal sedation is an extension of the autonomy of
refusal of treatment, to which is added sedation to
provide physical and psychological comfort. Like
personal refusal of treatment, terminal sedation is
legal in all states. It is not subject to oversight or
regulation. The final decision and all details are
worked out by patient, family, and physician, with
no requirement for any other input or notification.
Assisted suicide, on the other hand, is legal only in
one state, Oregon, where it is strictly regulated.
For the competent, conscious patient, a line currently separates terminal sedation, which is legal,
from physician-assisted suicide, which is not. The
unconscious or incompetent patient presents a more
complicated problem. The laws of most states now
permit a family member or some other responsible
surrogate to speak for the unconscious patient in
requesting withdrawal of treatment, including artificial feeding. All states respect this if there is strong
evidence (a living will, etc.) as to what the patient's
preferences were when well, and many states do not
require any formal evidence at all. There is no need
or place for legal surrogacy in physician-assisted suicide, since taking one's own life is a conscious act by
definition. Similarly, a surrogate wishing to end the
life of an unconscious patient need not consider terminal sedation since simple withdrawal of the
necessary artificial feeding will suffice and is legal.
The most complicated issue is the person who is
totally incompetent, but not unconscious, as in
Alzheimer's disease, the most widely feared of all endof-life scenarios in this country. A person who is
farsighted enough may certainly request, in a living
will, that his life be ended by terminal sedation upon
reaching some arbitrary stage in the illness (unable
to recognize family members, etc.) Leaving the final
decision to a surrogate, even with a detailed living
will, pushes such a death into the realm of non-voluntary euthanasia. The mechanism for inducing the
death may be some blend of dehydration and sedation, since they are "legal." However, the step must
be taken by other people, be based on the original

living will, and be administered to a person who is
not currently competent to consent to anything and
is not even dying. This is already a subject of moral
debate, and will become a legal issue in years to come,
but only after we have reached some level of acceptance of assisted suicide and even of voluntary
euthanasia. Pressure for this will come from demands
to respect the patient's original autonomy, general
horror of living for years totally demented and dependent, and the economics of caring for large
numbers of elderly people who are so hopelessly ill.
Today, about 4.6 million Americans are over the age
of eighty-five and about half of them, 2.4 million,
have severe dementia. By the year 2040, both of these
numbers are expected to double to 12.3 million over
the age of eighty-five, and 5.1 million with severe
dementia.

Terminal Sedation-Today & Tomorrow
Recently there has been strong interest in providing
better care at the end of life. It is recognized that our
dominant medical goal of curing disease distracts us
from the needs of those who cannot be cured. Many
groups have taken steps to study and provide better
palliative care, while others search for ways to allow more dignified and peaceful deaths, free from
unnecessary suffering. Many ethical and moral aspects of end-of-life care are being examined, including
active versus passive, double effect, terminal sedation and dehydration, and physician-assisted suicide.
Society, the law, and the medical profession are trying to decide what limits to set on how people may
die, recognizing that some do not want to live the
final weeks that are necessitated by the natural course
of their illnesses. They do not have many options.
As a society, we are not yet ready to legalize assisted
suicide in most states, but even the U.S. Supreme
Court acknowledges that, with more experience, that
day may come. Although the Court does not support individual autonomy to the extent of giving
physician-assisted suicide constitutional protection,
it does feel that people who are terminally ill and
suffering significantly should have some meaningful
recourse to medical help for relief, even if it means
shortening life. The Court clearly leaves the door
open for terminal sedation.
Some undoubtedly see terminal sedation as a
stepping stone to physician-assisted suicide and even
euthanasia, a moral and legal loophole that should
be closed. Conservative lawmakers could attack
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terminal sedation on the basis of physician intent or
improper use of drugs, if only to curry favor with
even more conservative constituents. The arguments
would be the same as those being used to counter
the Oregon laws permitting physician-assisted suicide. Others view terminal sedation as an end in itself,
an approach to shortening life that will be acceptable to some patients who are dying and to the
general public, a line that can be held against pressure for physician-assisted suicide.
I think terminal sedation is indeed a stepping stone
towards physician-assisted suicide, a compromise for
the time being. It seems cruel to ask a patient and a
family to accept a route to death that takes a week or
two to travel, however painless the journey may be. If
and when assisted suicide becomes legal, terminal sedation will not be needed or wanted by very many
people. However, until our laws become more accommodating, interest in terminal sedation will grow, as
pressure for patient autonomy continues to increase.
Blurry as terminal sedation may be in concept, it is
accepted and practiced. Therefore, terminal sedation
will be hard for lawmakers to back away from, and
harder still for government agencies to control, monitor, or bury under oppressive restrictions.
At the present time, in the mind of the public,

voluntary dehydration and sedation is not an attractive way to die. As such, it appeals to a relatively
few, unusually strong-willed and well-informed
people. The advantage to elective terminal sedation
is that it is legal and can be done painlessly. The legality does not derive from close analysis of the acts
under all circumstances, but from recognition that
many, if not most, people die naturally of dehydration, and that sedation to control suffering at the
end of life is an expected, accepted, and traditional
role of medicine.
As concern about end-of-life issues increases and
assisted suicide remains legally off limits, more and
more emphasis will be placed on terminal sedation.
Indeed, legislative rejection of assisted suicide may
provide a "dam" effect that forces more people to
turn to terminal sedation as their only acceptable
option. It can, should, and will be discussed more
publicly, and should certainly enter into conversations between physicians and patients who want to
end their suffering sooner. As we continue to examine the needs and desires of dying patients, our
willingness to provide appropriate medical intervention will increase. The needs of people at the end of
life are multiple and varied, and our responses to
them should be, too.
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